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Salesforce response to a compromised Optimizely script on its websites (opens in a new tab)

You will learn how the Optimizely compromise reached Salesforce web properties, what Salesforce has disabled, and which third-party scripts to audit in your own Experience Cloud, Commerce Cloud and Marketing Cloud pages.

  1. 16 Nov 2026: Exposure window, about 04:00 to 21:00 UTC
  2. 16 Nov 2026: Researcher reports 188 compromised files
  3. 17 Nov 2026: Optimizely confirms the malicious code
  4. Now: Admins audit for Optimizely snippets
The incident ran from the November 16 exposure window through Salesforce's response and the actions it recommends

On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely, a third-party experimentation platform, and inserted malicious JavaScript into some customer projects. The injected code sat in the Project JavaScript field, which runs on every page. Because the files were still served from Optimizely’s trusted content delivery network, browsers and many security tools treated them as legitimate. Security researcher Scott Helm reported 188 compromised files across 178 organizations, Salesforce among them.

Salesforce says unauthorized changes were made to Optimizely scripts used on certain of its websites, and that those scripts could load malicious code in visitors’ browsers. As a precaution, it disabled Optimizely scripts across preview and production instances, and they will stay off until Optimizely’s remediation is verified, with no timeline to re-enable. Salesforce states it has no evidence the incident affected Salesforce-platform or subscription services. It is following its vulnerability response processes, monitoring for malicious activity, and will notify affected customers if it finds unauthorized access to their data.

The post says the exposure window ran from about 04:00 to 21:00 UTC on November 16. Optimizely says the vulnerability is closed and the injected code has been removed. Its statement points to the account signup flow as the route in.

If you build or host web applications on Salesforce platforms, you are affected only if your own team embedded Optimizely Web Experimentation scripts in them. Salesforce recommends that admins audit Experience Cloud sites, Commerce Cloud storefronts and Marketing Cloud landing pages for Optimizely snippets. Where a customer-facing site used an affected project on November 16, review application logs and watch for payment-form tampering and unusual session activity, such as logins or token use from unfamiliar locations.

Read the original at Salesforce Blog (opens in a new tab)

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Optimizely compromise injected malicious scripts into Salesforce sites (opens in a new tab)

You will learn how a third-party script vendor was used to inject malicious JavaScript into 178 sites, including several Salesforce domains, and what to audit on your own Salesforce-powered sites in response.

  1. Attackers add code to Project JavaScript field
  2. Optimizely CDN passes code to site visitors
  3. Visitors' browsers run the injected script
  4. Script swaps crypto addresses, takes card data
How malicious code reached visitors through Optimizely's delivery network

Malicious JavaScript was injected into Optimizely’s Web experimentation platform and served to visitors of 178 organizations on November 16, including Salesforce. The code was designed to swap cryptocurrency addresses for the attacker’s own, collect payment card information, and target iOS devices with additional exploit chains. Salesforce says its own systems were not compromised, but it disabled Optimizely scripts across preview and production instances as a precaution while it investigates.

The attackers reportedly placed code in a “Project JavaScript” field in customer Optimizely accounts, which the vendor’s content delivery network then passed on to visitors. It is not yet clear how the attackers gained write access to those accounts. Optimizely has said it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, and added security measures. Equifax has stopped using Optimizely altogether.

The affected Salesforce domains named in the research were evergage.com, exacttarget.com, pardot.com and salesforce-scrt.com, along with four others not named. The article treats the incident as a lesson in supply chain risk: a secure platform can still be brought down by a vendor script running on its pages. It suggests auditing the third-party scripts on Experience Cloud and Commerce Cloud storefronts, removing any that are no longer used, and investigating any that nobody in the organization can account for.

For end users, the article recommends updating iOS devices to 18.7.3 or later, or to iOS 26.3 or later, depending on what the device supports.

Read the original at Salesforce Ben (opens in a new tab)

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